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Jerry A. Hausman and Davis A. Wise 
During the past decade the United States government has spent over 500 
million dollars on social experiments. The experiments attempt to deter- 
mine the potential effect of a policy option by trying it out on a group of 
subjects, some of whom are randomly assigned to a treatment group and 
are the recipients of  the proposed policy, while others are assigned to a 
control group. The difference in the outcomes for the two groups is the 
estimated effect of  the policy option. This approach is an alternative to 
making judgments about the effect of  the proposed policy from infer- 
ences based on observational (survey) data, but without the advantages 
of randomization. While a few social experiments have been conducted in 
the past, this development is a relatively new approach to the evaluation 
of the effect of proposed government policies. Much of the $500 million 
has gone into transfer payments to the experimental subjects, most of 
whom have benefited from the experiments. But the most important 
question is whether the experiments have been successful in their primary 
goal of providing precise estimates of  the effects of  a proposed govern- 
ment policy. This book is a collection of  papers and comments from a 
conference held in 1981 under the sponsorship of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research and supported by the Alfred Sloan Foundation. At 
the conference papers were presented that addressed the question of the 
success of  the experiments in achieving this evaluation goal. 
In addition to the question of the success of the experiments for policy 
evaluation, whether the experiments were worth the cost was a recurring 
question among the conference participants. That is, could similar in- 
formation have been provided by  the use of  econometric models and 
estimates on available survey data? It is important to remember that the 
policies that were evaluated in many of  the experiments were far different 
from then-current policies that could be evaluated from survey data. For 
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example the income-guarantee levels for male-headed households in the 
negative-income-tax experiments were far higher than any state provided 
in its welfare system. Similarly, time-of-use electricity prices for residen- 
tial customers were unheard of  in the United States before the experi- 
ments began. Nevertheless, estimated income elasticities from models of 
labor supply based on, say, the Survey of  Economic Opportunity could 
be used to predict the outcome of the negative-income-tax experiments, 
and data from Europe might be used to predict the effect of  the time-of- 
use electricity experiments. The authors of  each of  the first four papers 
that  evaluate what  we  have  learned  from  the  four  major groups of 
experiments focus on this question as well as the measured effect of  the 
experiments. 
It is important to keep in mind the conclusions  based on hindsight, and 
they should be evaluated in this light. Even if  the results of  the experi- 
ments could have been well predicted by previous econometric estimates, 
no one could have been confident of this outcome before the experiments 
actually took place. Indeed this was a major motivation for the experi- 
ments.  The authors of  the four evaluation papers also consider what 
other purposes  the results  of  the experiments  are used  for  because 
experimental results may be superior to econometric estimates for these 
other uses. But since, to a large extent, the policy questions the experi- 
ments were designed to answer still have not been decided, the final 
accounting of  the worth of  the experiments in helping to decide the 
course of  public policy is probably fairly far off  into the future. 
The methodology  of  randomized  experiments was  formalized and 
achieved wide  acceptance due to the fundamental research of  R. A. 
Fisher and his co-workers. Yet most of their research dealt with agricul- 
tural experiments. Complex statistical questions arise when this meth- 
odology is applied to social experiments. Individuals may refuse to par- 
ticipate in experiments or they may drop out while the experiment is 
underway. These effects must be accounted for in the evaluation of  the 
experimental  results.  The next  set of  papers  addresses questions of 
statistical and econometric methodology with respect to social experi- 
ments.  Questions  of  sample selection and treatment  assignment are 
analyzed.  Also  an  overall model of  how  the results will  be  used  is 
postulated. The possibility exists of  a decision-theoretic approach to the 
evaluation of policies which could lead to a considerably sharper focus in 
the design of  the experiments. 
The last group of papers takes up the extremely complicated question 
of how the output of the experiments is actually used in policy formula- 
tion. Experiments provide new information that can lead to reevaluation 
of previously proposed policies or the formulation of new policy options. 
The analysis of  the experiments and the policy-formulation process be- 
come intertwined, and yet the latter is constrained to some extent by the 3  Introduction 
political process. What are the conditions under which the analysis of the 
experiments has the most influence on the policy process? Again the final 
impact of  the experiments will not be known until more time passes, but 
these questions are important to the design and analysis of  successful 
social experiments. 
We now turn from this general introduction to a summary of  each of 
the papers presented at the conference. Each paper was commented on 
by either one or two discussants, and we also summarize their comments. 
The authors had the opportunity to revise their papers after the confer- 
ence and in some instances reacted to discussants suggestions. But most 
of the comments deal with broad questions motivated by or raised in the 
papers and raise valuable additional points about the success of  social 
experiments and possible improvements in their implementation. 
Dennis J. Aigner in his paper, “The Residential Electricity Time-of- 
Use  Pricing Experiments:  What  Have  We  Learned?”  evaluates  the 
fifteen time-of-use (TOU) experiments that have taken place since 1975. 
The main question at issue is whether TOU  prices would produce altera- 
tions in the demands of residential customers for peak-period electricity 
large enough so that the net effect on the customer’s welfare plus the 
change in revenues and investments required of the electric utility would 
justify implementation of TOU rates. That is, the TOU rates are a close 
application of marginal-cost pricing by the utility. The experiments were 
designed to discover whether the change in rate pattern to a time-of-day 
basis would lead to an increase in social welfare. In his summary of  the 
results,  Aigner finds much  less agreement  among the price-elasticity 
estimates than is found in the labor-supply studies of  the NIT experi- 
ments. However, he does find that the results lead to the conclusion that 
peak-period demands are inelastic when expenditure is held constant, 
which can have important implications for the effects of a TOU rate plan 
on utility revenues. Aigner then goes on to consider the welfare effects of 
the TOU  rate plans. Based on the results of the experiments he concludes 
that only the largest customers are likely to benefit from the introduction 
of  TOU rates. However, these large customers consume a significant 
proportion of total residential electricity demand. Lastly, Aigner takes 
up the difficult question of “transferability.” Can the results of an experi- 
ment in one jurisdiction be used to predict the outcome of a TOU  plan in 
another area? Aigner offers an interesting approach to this important 
problem. 
Overall, Aigner concludes that only a very few experiments have led to 
reliable results. However, he does not find the differences in elasticity 
estimates too disturbing when considered across different service areas. 
His view is that better experimental design would have led to consider- 
ably better results. He also points out a potentially important limiting 
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experiments since the appliance stock has been held fixed. He believes 
that the long-run  response  could  be  considerably  different from the 
response suggested by estimates based on the experimental results. 
Paul L. Joskow, in his comments, agrees with Aigner’s conclusion on 
the limited usefulness of  many of the TOU experiments. However, he 
doubts that the neoclassical welfare analyses used by Aigner to evaluate 
the TOU rates will be acceptable to state regulatory commissions. He 
also emphasizes that the short-run nature of  the experiments will limit 
their usefulness. Therefore, he concludes that the TOU  rate experiments 
will have little if any positive impact on regulatory decisions to implement 
TOU rates. Lester D. Taylor, in his comments on the Aigner paper, 
concludes that the evidence  is not  good enough to make  a scientific 
evaluation of  the desirability of  TOU  rate plans. Thus, all three authors 
feel that we have not “learned enough” from the TOU  rate experiments 
although they all conclude that a limited amount of knowledge has been 
gained through the experiments. 
Harvey  S. Rosen  reviews the housing-allowance experiment  in  his 
paper, “Housing Behavior and the Experimental  Housing-Allowance 
Program: What Have We Learned?” This experiment granted housing 
subsidies to the poor to determine to what extent they would increase 
their housing consumption. The Experimental Housing Allowance Pro- 
gram (EHAP) was divided into two parts. The demand experiment was 
designed to determine the effect on housing consumption of  the sub- 
sidies. The supply experiment was designed to determine the effect of the 
housing allowances on the rental housing market. Given the relatively 
inelastic  short-run  supply  of  rental  housing  units,  it  is  important to 
estimate the effect of a subsidy program on market rents. Rosen analyzes 
the value of EHAP in terms of  what additional knowledge we gained 
from the experiment which could not have been known from previous 
econometric studies on cross-sectional data. He  bases his criterion on the 
argument that a structural econometric model is necessary to analyze 
housing consumption patterns, even with experimental data. He consid- 
ers the problems that arise in econometric estimation of  housing-demand 
functions, but he concludes that these same  problems were present in the 
analysis  of  the EHAP demand data so that the experiment  did  not 
alleviate the usual problems that applied work in housing-demand en- 
counters. His conclusions are quite similar for the problems that exist in 
the analysis of  the EHAP  supply experiment. Thus, overall Rosen argues 
that the problems faced by investigators who have used conventional 
survey data continue to exist in the experimental data except for varia- 
tions in the price of  housing induced by the experiments. He does not 
think  that the social  experiment  was  necessary  and  concludes  “The 
money would have been better spent on augmenting conventional data 
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John M. Quigley broadly agrees with Rosen’s conclusions. He outlines 
some more complete analytical models for problems that arise in the 
housing experiment. He raises the additional problem that the duration 
of the EHAP demand experiment was quite short, since it lasted for only 
four years. Therefore inferences about the long-run response may be 
problematic. He  feels that the effect of long-term subsidies  might be quite 
different from the observed response to the EHAP  subsidies. Gregory K. 
Ingram, in his  discussion of  the Rosen  paper, also comes to similar 
conclusions about the value of EHAP. He does think, however, that 
program-participation rates which are an important determinant of pro- 
gram costs would be difficult to predict without an experiment. But his 
overall assessment is that EHAP  did not help solve the many problems of 
measurement that exist in the analysis of housing markets. He concludes 
that the EHAP did have some value, but at too high a cost. He believes 
that only the demand experiment of  EHAP was worthwhile. 
In his paper, “Income-Maintenance Policy and Work Effort: Learning 
from Experiments and Labor-Market Studies,” Frank P. Stafford re- 
views the evidence from the largest and perhaps most important group of 
experiments, the negative-income-tax (NIT) experiments. The five NIT 
experiments were designed primarily to analyze the effects of  a poten- 
tially large change in the income support or welfare system in the United 
States. Since the cost of an NIT program would be closely related to the 
labor-supply response of individuals to the income guarantee and the tax 
rate, these parameters were varied across individuals or families in the 
experimental design. The response of individuals or families to the intro- 
duction of an NIT in terms of their work effort is closely related to their 
labor-supply behavior. Stafford’s first question is “Why did we need the 
experiments at all?” He argues that from previous studies on survey data, 
labor economists had formed a consensus view on the range within which 
the labor elasticities would fall. Therefore estimates of the effect of the 
introduction of an NIT could be made from the coefficient estimates from 
these previous  studies.  The case for the NIT experiments from this 
vantage point he believes is perhaps not overwhelming. 
Stafford discusses two reasons for the NIT experiments. One possible 
role is that the experiments would be easier to understand and to inter- 
pret by policy makers who would place more confidence in their results 
than in simulation estimates from survey data. The NIT experiments 
provide direct evidence on the alteration of work effort which could well 
be more convincing. The second reason for the NIT experiments, which 
Stafford finds less convincing, is that “model free” analysis of the experi- 
ments is possible while the related labor-supply studies must be based on 
econometric models of  questionable validity. This latter reason is less 
convincing, in Stafford’s  viewpoint, because any actual NIT plan likely to 
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and a model will be necessary to predict its labor-supply effects. Whether 
or not one finds the case for theoretical models to be strong, Stafford 
concludes that a strong case exists for the experiments to answer the main 
question of  the effect of  an NIT on work effort. 
Besides the effect of an NIT on work effort, other outcomes of interest 
which Stafford identifies are on-the-job training, divorce or change in 
family structure, and labor-market outcomes of  unemployment, work 
effort, and early retirement. In terms of  the main variable of  interest, 
work effort, Stafford finds the results of  the NIT experiments broadly 
consistent with nonexperimental studies. Stafford argues that to answer 
the question of whether the experiments were “worth it” would require a 
decision theoretic model that could evaluate the possible policy alterna- 
tives and take account of the greater precision, or less uncertainty, that 
would result from the experimental evidence. Evidence from the NIT 
experiments on the other areas of labor-market behavior is valuable, but 
not conclusive, in Stafford’s opinion. The effect of  the experiments on 
greater divorce rates points up the important effects of transfer systems 
on family decision making. Overall, Stafford concludes that a great deal 
was learned from the experiments. Furthermore, he sees the possibility of 
continued research using the data that was collected, which would help 
answer other important questions. 
Sherwin Rosen, in his comments, emphasizes the decrease in main- 
tained model hypotheses which an experiment allows. He emphasizes 
that the finding of  a similar work-effort  response found in  the  NIT 
experiments as is found in survey data could not have been known in 
advance.  While he thinks that room for improvement in  design and 
analysis of the experiments certainly exists, overall he concludes that the 
NIT experiments led to a valuable increase in our knowledge in the area 
of  work response to change in income guarantees and tax rates. In his 
comments, Zvi Griliches emphasizes the importance of randomization in 
experiments  and the “exogeneity”  introduced  by  experimental treat- 
ments. Griliches also emphasizes the importance of  the experiments in 
providing increased variation in the data which in general will lead to 
better econometric estimates.  Overall, he takes a somewhat stronger 
view than does Stafford on the value of  the experiments. 
Jeffrey E. Harris analyzes the health experiments in his paper, “Mac- 
roexperiments versus Microexperiments for Health Policy.” His major 
point is that health experiments may be better designed and analyzed at 
the community or group level which makes them differ fundamentally 
from the microexperiments at the individual level of most other types of 
economic and social experiments.  Harris first considers the problems 
inherent in the microexperiments that have been conducted so far. He 
concentrates on the Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial (MRFIT) 
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MRFIT are difficult to analyze because of  the problem of  participation 
bias. He also has doubts about the sample selection procedure in the HIS 
experiment. He then considers the potential problems of attrition bias, of 
interdependence among individual responses, and of Hawthorne effects. 
Overall, he thinks that these problems lead to quite complicated model 
designs to analyze the effects of the experiments. Harris feels that many 
of these problems could be minimized by the use of macroexperiments 
such as the Stanford Heart Disease Prevention Program (SHDPP) which 
uses as the unit of observation a complete community. While he does not 
find the SHDPP without fault, he believes that its main problem could be 
alleviated by  a different experimental design. He argues that repeated 
cross-sectional sampling in macroexperiments is the preferred design. He 
favors the macroexperiments  mainly because use  of  the mass media 
becomes a valued policy option since it does not affect the behavior of 
controls that are geographically distinct communities. He feels that fur- 
ther development  of  the theory of  the design and analysis of  macro- 
experiments would be useful since they offer the opportunity of  more 
convincing experiments than do the microexperiments with their insur- 
mountable difficulties. 
Paul B. Ginsburg has reservations about Harris’s claims for macroex- 
periments. He feels that the use of  macroexperiments is limited by cost 
considerations. He thinks that many experimental situations have ele- 
ments of both micro- and macroexperiments so that the choice between 
the two types is not often clear-cut. In his comments, Lawrence L. Orr 
takes sharp issue with Harris’s conclusions. Orr thinks that a careful 
analysis is needed to decide which type of experiment is more useful in a 
particular situation. He disagrees most fundamentally with Harris over 
the question of  whether the role of  an experiment is to decide on the 
efficacy of a particular policy option or whether it is to analyze a range of 
possible policies. He believes that the latter situation is more typical so 
that microexperiments are needed to estimate individual response func- 
tions. The “black box” macroexperiment then becomes inappropriate. 
Furthermore, he believes that many of the problems inherent in microex- 
periments also exist in macroexperiments. Orr also believes that addi- 
tional important problems of  interpretation exist in the results of  mac- 
roexperiments. Most important of  these limitations is the sample-size 
constraint in macroexperiments together with the difficulty of control and 
administration. Orr concludes that the particular situation must be ana- 
lyzed to determine whether a micro or a macro approach is more appro- 
priate. He differs strongly with Harris’s conclusion on the superiority of 
macro- over microexperiments. 
The next set of  papers considers the question of  experimental design 
and analysis. Jerry A. Hausman and David A. Wise in “Technical Prob- 
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set forth general guidelines that would enhance the usefulness of  future 
social experiments and to suggest methods of  correcting for inherent 
limitation in the experiments. They feel that more attention should be 
paid to the possibility of  randomized design and its associated analysis. 
The experiments to date have utilized endogenous sample-selection pro- 
cedures and treatment-assignment procedures which subvert the possibil- 
ity of  using classical analysis-of-variance procedures to determine the 
results of  the experiments.  Still, inherent limitations exist, even with 
randomized design, which are difficult or impossible to avoid. The prob- 
lems of voluntary participation and of attrition from the experiment will 
continue to exist. But Hausman and Wise argue that these problems are 
considerably easier to treat if  the confounding problems of  endogenous 
stratification and assignment are not present. Lastly, they propose that 
the experiments be designed to estimate only a small number of  treat- 
ment effects rather than a large range of policy options which often leads 
to imprecise estimates of  the effect of  any single policy option. 
John Conlisk agrees with Hausman and Wise that endogenous strat- 
ification should be avoided if  possible. However, he is in less agreement 
with the principle of  random treatment assignment. He thinks that in- 
teractions between treatments and exogenous variables are of  central 
importance to the behavioral response of the experiments. He also thinks 
that the number of experimental design points must be based on particu- 
lar design considerations so that an overall judgment cannot be readily 
made. He concludes that self-selection  and attrition problems are of great 
importance and that experimental design theory needs to be extended to 
deal with these problems. In his comments on the Hausman-Wise paper, 
Daniel L. McFadden concurs with the use of  robust techniques such as 
ANOVA for the analysis of  the experiments. He argues that random 
treatment assignment is the most important factor in an acceptable design 
in that it isolates the effects of  other sample-frame difficulties. Endoge- 
nous sampling designs  can then be used, although the statistical analysis is 
complicated somewhat. He agrees that problems of  self-selection and 
attrition are important and suggests that the focus of  future research 
should be on robust statistical methods to correct these problems. 
Frederick Mosteller and Milton C. Weinstein consider the cost effec- 
tiveness of  the experiments  in their  paper,  “Toward Evaluating the 
Cost-Effectiveness of  Medical and Social Experiments. ” Mosteller and 
Weinstein emphasize the importance of  learning about the efficacy and 
cost-effectiveness of  medical practices so that decisions about proper 
medical procedures can be made. They then proceed to consider the costs 
and benefits of  the evaluation procedures. Therefore, they propose to 
evaluate the evaluations. They evaluate the procedure of  a randomized 
clinical trial  (RCT). To do so  they consider the question of  how the 
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model for evaluating the cost-effectiveness  of the clinical trials. They do 
so by  using a decision analytic model to assess the cost-effectiveness. 
They formulate a Bayesian model and after deriving the results consider 
the effect of  relaxing some of  the assumption of  the model. 
Mosteller and Weinstein then consider inherent problems in the assess- 
ment of  cost-effectiveness of  medical evaluations. They discuss both 
normative and positive models of response to the evaluations. The ques- 
tion of institutional design, to assure appropriate use of the information, 
is also covered. Other problems such as the assessment of information in 
the experiments and their utilization are discussed. 
Then Mosteller and Weinstein turn to examples to examine the useful- 
ness of  their suggested approach. The examples deal with the gastric- 
freezing procedure and the treatment of  hypertension. They conclude 
that further study is needed but that a potential cost-benefit calculation 
should be made before a trial is undertaken. Furthermore, they argue 
that controlled experiments cannot remove all the problems of evaluation 
but that they are of value and should be utilized more often. They believe 
that an incentive system which would lead to increased tests of  efficacy 
would be advantageous policy. 
In his comments Joseph B. Kadane agrees with the Mosteller and 
Weinstein conclusions about the need for more evaluation. He points out 
some of  the limitations of  their model and questions how the potential 
cost-benefit calculation that Mosteller and Weinstein call for could be 
made without additional information. 
In “The Use of  Information in the Policy Process: Are Social-Policy 
Experiments Worthwhile?” David S. Mundel argues that social-policy 
experiments are very expensive and therefore should be undertaken only 
in very particular situations, He argues that the potential utility of social 
experiments depends on the following factors: whether the experiments 
can answer the questions that are important to policy makers; whether 
the answers can be understood, given that important policy questions can 
be answered; and finally, whether the answers alter the beliefs of policy 
makers, given that they provide understandable  answers to important 
questions. 
Ernst W. Stromsdorfer examines the effect on policy of social experi- 
ments in his paper, “Social Science Analysis and the Formulation of 
Public Policy: Illustrations of What the President “Knows” and How He 
Comes to “Know”  It.” Stromsdorfer begins with the contention that 
policy makers will use whatever data are at hand to support their position 
whether or not the data come from a social experiment. He therefore 
considers the larger questions of  how information is used in the policy- 
formulation process and how it interacts with the political process in the 
making of policy decisions. Stromsdorfer sees three processes for knowl- 
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system (MIS) data, natural or quasi experiments, and classical experi- 
ments. He concludes that while a variety of  experimental data exists of 
the natural, quasi-experimental, and classical experimental variety, they 
are of uneven quality and are not used in a consistent manner. 
But Stromsdorfer does believe that this information has been used in 
the consideration of policy issues in recent Congressional and administra- 
tion decisions. He points to the issues of  welfare reform which have been 
affected  by the results of  the NIT experiments, unemployment insurance 
which has been affected by numerous studies for natural or quasi experi- 
ments, and social security reform. At the same time evaluation research 
often follows the lead of  policy  development.  But Stromsdorfer also 
identified research categories that have had little or no impact. Overall, 
he concludes that program analysis and evaluation can be an extremely 
valuable policy tool. But at the same time, the reality of political con- 
straint must be recognized since it sets limits on the collection, analysis, 
and usefulness of  data and analysis which may be produced by experi- 
mentation. 
Henry Aaron in his comments on Stromdorfer’s paper agrees with the 
focus of  research  being  used  in  an adversary  process.  Furthermore, 
Aaron emphasizes that the adversaries are contending for power, not the 
scientific truth that might arise from the experiments. But Aaron con- 
cludes that social experiments have been a force for slowing the adoption 
of new policies. Social experiments show problems to be more compli- 
cated than  is  commonly  appreciated, with  results  more  difficult  to 
achieve.  Lawrence E. Lynn, Jr., in  his  comments takes no view on 
whether the experiments have been useful. He  warns against the overuse 
of  the “rational actor” model of the political process. 